In the concluding section of the Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine describes our entire knowledge as a “man made fabric,” (Two Dogmas of Empiricism, p. 39) an epistemological system that’s essentially a human construct consisting of statements, but one that’s constrained or limited by the vast accumulation of experience. When new experience that’s not confirmed or compatible with the existing construct occurs, there are repercussions that alters statements within the construct, and in turn, causes a ripple effect that changes other “logically connected” (p. 39) statements. (more…)

In the Logische Aufbau der Welt, Rudolf Carnap was concerned with the objectivity of science, and how his rational reconstruction, could successfully explain why science is objective, despite starting with an autopsychological basis. In section 66, Carnap raises the challenge his system must solve: How can science consist of “intersubjective valid assertions,” (Logische, p. 106) when all physical objects are constructed from subjective experience? (more…)

In the Analysis of Sensations, Ernst Mach attempted to categorize elements into three groups:  A B C as the independent objects of the world, K L M as one’s own body, and a b c as the contents of one’s own mind. It seemed trivial to extend this chain of relations to other people’s bodies, termed as K’ L’ M’. But once Mach tried to classify other people’s mental contents as well, as a’ b’ c’, he realized that this analogy had taken him far from the comforts of direct perception (one perceives other objects, and is capable of perceiving one’s own body, and one has one’s own thoughts) to  inferential assumptions, a much less certain form of knowledge. Mach’s description of “plunging into an abyss” (Sensations, §8, p13)  invokes the problem of other minds. (more…)

The paradox Kant raises in the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, §13, is that two intrinsically alike objects must be interchangeable. However, some objects are exactly intrinsically alike, but they’re not interchangeable. He noted that his right hand is virtually identical to its image in the mirror. However, he could not replace his right hand with its mirror-image. He then proceeded to state that he could not think of any “internal difference” (Prolegomena, p. 37) between his right hand and its image in the mirror. Yet he could sense the difference between them for they were not truly congruent. (more…)