I think both mind/body are incommensurate descriptions that vie for the title of truth of ontology of objects. We aren’t finished with demythologizing our ideas, and by getting rid of the Cartesian self we are de-divinizing philosophy by disposing an underlying substantial metaphysical center that grounds existence.
Originally, Enlightenment thinkers were unable to deal with the incompatibility between dead matter and first person experience of human consciousness. My solution? Non reductive materialism that gives up the mind-body problem.
The brain is basically the reweaving of electrical charges alongside the network of neural synapses. The mind can be redescribed as the reweaving of beliefs and desires that adjust truth along the network of related statements. Your brain is just the collection of synapses without a center for nothing is independent of this conglomeration. In the same sense your mind is a contingent network of beliefs & desires, and nothing at center to affix the bundle of beliefs/desires. Then there’s no self that has these mental elements cuz the self is those elements.
The Cartesian dream of reifying the self is over. The idea of a self as an object that’s represented to ourselves is also gone. No longer is there an urge to separate the mental from the physical in the ontological sense. Then this non reductive materialist account of the self chimes with nominalism, which does not tolerate the sentence/fact dichotomy & anti-essentialism that denies the subject/object dichotomy.