There are two aspects of the world: representation and will, which is the thing-in-itself in appearance. The world as representation consists of individual objects that are spatiotemporal, causally connected. We know representation empirically, including its a priori forms. The world as will is the undifferentiated inner nature of all objects. We know the will immediately and intimately, in each individual case, and for other objects, this is known by philosophical reflection and inference. However, the world as the absolute and ultimate thing in itself is utterly unknowable in principle. Ergo, there is no contradiction when Schopenhauer claims the thing in itself as will. Continue reading World as Will and Representation: Book II
Review of The World as Will and Representation
In The World as Will and Representation, Arthur Schopenhauer spoke as a Teutonic philosopher, with mighty prose and thunderous proclamations from the lofty heights of classic Sophia and utterly uninfected by the pretentious delusions of grandeur that afflicted his German contemporaries. His distinctiveness among the early 19th century thinkers inspired Nietzsche to call him the “un-German to the point of genius,” (Beyond Good and Evil, 204) and Thomas Mann in turn called him the “most rational philosopher of the irrational.” Continue reading Review of The World as Will and Representation
The Trivialization of modern philosophy, part II
A. J. Ayer, when charged with trivialization of philosophy, claimed that the distinction between “about language” and “about the world” is not sharp, for the world is basically our description of the world in our system of concepts. Therefore the investigation of language is the investigation of the structure of the world as experienced by human beings. Continue reading The Trivialization of modern philosophy, part II
The Trivialization of modern philosophy
I have compiled a brief essay on linguistic analysis and its trivialization of philosophy. The first part will look at the historical precedent of linguistic analysis and the methodology of the program, and its limitations. In the next part I will focus on Wittgenstein, on whether the structure of the world is necessarily the structure of our language, and other related aspects. Continue reading The Trivialization of modern philosophy
Comments about Kierkegaard
Some thoughts about Soren Kierkegaard, from a philosophical angle. Continue reading Comments about Kierkegaard
The Great Contradiction of Christianity
Previously posted on alldeaf.com, and the subsequent posts have been modified accordingly…
Here’s a dilemma I’ve been thinking lately, and not only does it prove the incoherence of Christianity, it also demonstrates the internal contradiction within apologetics. It has to do with God’s pure and holy state that cannot abide the presence of a sinner. He is incapable of forgiving sinners without a meditator, and that is the sacrifice of JC himself, jayzum kerow, alias Jesus Christ. Jesus’ sacrifice was necessary, for otherwise, even one little widdle sin would result the utter annihilation of the sinner in the presence of the Almighty. But here’s the crux of the problem, and consequently the incoherence as well as the illogic of Christianity. Continue reading The Great Contradiction of Christianity
Should philosophical discourse be clear and distinct?
Some people think there are things in the realm of knowledge that are absolutely beyond the ken of the man in the street (MITS). I would have to say no, because that would mean the MITS is completely incapable of learning, and that the supposed realms of knowledge are wholly inaccessible. Continue reading Should philosophical discourse be clear and distinct?
Deaf and Dumb?
In this blog I will deconstruct the notorious scholar of Deaf studies, Jack Gannon, who blamed Aristotle for that moniker, “deaf and dumb.” Continue reading Deaf and Dumb?
Why ethical judgments are nonsensical
This brief piece explains why all ethical judgments are essentially nonsense. Since ethical judgments are based on absolute standards, which themselves are independent of all other standards, they are neither rational nor irrational. Therefore ethics as the philosophy of morality is a useless passion, and does not have anything to do with truth or falsehood. Continue reading Why ethical judgments are nonsensical
On the religious and the tragic impulses
This short blog is an illustration of the contrast between two impulses: the religious and a very ancient one, the tragic. The religious impulse comes from a long and hard look into the depths of the human element – suffering – and in the process of doing so, a divine force is postulated, inferred, invented, or projected.To be religious is to see with the eyes of faith, which is the facility of seeing in the dark. Faith enables groping around in a pitch black universe. Having such eyes leads to the absence of expectation for evidence, assurance, or justification of any sort. Continue reading On the religious and the tragic impulses