Deaf and Dumb?

http://0.s3.envato.com/files/41916115/monkeys.jpg

In this blog I will deconstruct the notorious scholar of Deaf studies, Jack Gannon, who blamed Aristotle for that moniker, “deaf and dumb.” While reading his excerpt, I found his rhetoric to be over cooked.

Deaf and Dumb — A relic from the medieval English era, this is the granddaddy of all negative labels pinned on deaf and hard of hearing people.

If Gannon did his homework, as in investigate the definition of the words in its historical context, rather than presume the current meaning has never changed, then he would not consider it a negative label, or at least intended to be more than merely descriptive. The word “dumb” in Old English means “silent or unable to speak.” That there are negative connotations is a recent phenomenon; the word “dumb” acquired the meaning of low intellect only after the infiltration of the German dumm, and the earliest English use of “dumb” in the “stupid” context is 1823.

The Greek philosopher, Aristotle, pronounced us “deaf and dumb”, because he felt that deaf people were incapable of being taught, of learning, and of reasoned thinking.

Unless Gannon meant to blame somebody named Aristotle who lived in the 19th century, this is simply false. It is also worth noting that Gannon fails to actually list the reference of that infamous moniker. However, and despite Gannon’s sloppy phrasing, Aristotle is correct, as long we grant that without language, one cannot think. Without words, there is no conceptualization. Without communication, there is no exchange of ideas. Without the ability to read or write, there is no learning of philosophy, mathematics, or poetry. To be able to reason is the summing up of visual perception into concepts, but that is not possible without language. In this sense, the intellect is quantifiable. Aristotle’s argument is subtle, and deserves a far more careful reading than Gannon’s uncharitable and rather disingenuous version, which is little more than substance-free rhetoric.

To his way of thinking, if a person could not use his/her voice in the same way as hearing people, then there was no way that this person could develop cognitive abilities. (Source: Deaf Heritage, by Jack Gannon, 1980)

This, too, is false, for here is the actual quotation from “Sense and sensible,” where Aristotle employs a reasoned dialogue to conclude that the blind is more intelligent than the deaf.

Link

From the starting premise that hearing is crucial for the intellect, Aristotle’s conclusion is both valid and sound.

Conclusion: Aristotle was an early day scientist who reasoned from the available evidence of his senses. Nowadays, we know that the deaf are intelligent, contra Aristotle, but that comes only after acquiring language, a language that did not require the ability of hearing or speech. Therefore, Aristotle remained in the right.

Deaf can do, but not without tools!

Published by

Awet

...a philosophisticator who utters heresies, thinks theothanatologically and draws like Kirby on steroids.

8 thoughts on “Deaf and Dumb?”

  1. Lets dissect your logic using deductive reasoning.

    From the starting premise that hearing is crucial for the intellect, Aristotle’s conclusion is both valid and sound.

    and

    Of the two last mentioned, seeing, regarded as a supply for the primary wants of life, and in its direct effects, is the superior sense; but for developing intelligence, and in its indirect consequences, hearing takes the precedence

    Premise 1: Hearing is necessary to develop intelligence
    Premise 2: Ricky Taylor lacks hearing

    Conclusion: Ricky Taylor has not developed intelligence.

    Obviously the logic is faulty because Ricky Taylor is indeed intelligent.

    Aristotle continues by saying that

    while hearing announces only the distinctive qualities of sound, and, to some few animals, those also of voice. indirectly, however, it is hearing that contributes most to the growth of intelligence. For rational discourse is a cause of instruction in virtue of its being audible, which it is, not directly, but indirectly; since it is composed of words, and each word is a thought-symbol.

    In other words, because the deaf cannot speak, they cannot engage in rational discourse . A study of post-modernism, especially Foucault, explains that discourse involves back and forth interaction. Since the deaf cannot talk, they cannot demonstrate signs of intelligence. So, using deductive reasoning, let’s set up the following logic

    Premise 1: The deaf cannot show signs of intelligence because they do not speak
    Premise 2: Ricky Taylor cannot speak

    Conclusion: Ricky Taylor cannot show signs of intelligence

    Again, the above logic is faulty because not only is Ricky Talyor intelligent, but he can show intelligence in other ways.

    You have mentioned that Aristotle was a man of his times. He quite was; however, he began with certain premises and these premises were wrong. Had he approached intelligence without stipulations, it is likely he would have come to a different conclusion, as later philosophers did.

  2. Jon, thanks for your comments.

    But i think you played your hand far too early when you chose to equivocate in your parody. For aristotle, rational discourse is spoken language. Yes, this is the crucial point that no deaf person (at his time) could speak, much less have language.

    Of course, if there was a group of deaf/hard of hearing people who lived to adulthood, and socialized long enough, some sort of sign-language would develop. There’s no question that Chomsky’s contributions to linguistics, based on “pre-built grammar” in the brain, would lead to such conclusions, but i replied in kind, saying that infant mortality, as well as infanticide, was absurdly high back then, during the height of hellenistic Greece. The average woman gave birth to 12 children, but only 4 lived to adulthood. that kinda eliminates the possibility of a deaf community.

    Moreover, you probably are confusing rational intelligence with that of intuition, the animal understanding of its environment. A human being who lacks language may not be capable of rational thought, because language is absolutely necessary in order to represent experience, but they can cope with the environment with their animal intuitive understanding.

  3. Yes, this is the crucial point that no deaf person (at his time) could speak, much less have language

    You have no conclusive evidence regarding whether or not a deaf person in ancient greece had language. Certainly, infancide was encouraged, especially if the child were deaf, but given that the average age of diagnosis in mid-nineties America was three, it’s safe to assume that diagnosis wasn’t much better back then.

    Also, your claim that it is unlikely that a deaf person could develop language dismisses gesture studies as well as objective symbolic philosophies by the likes of Langer and Whitehead. Certainly, if symbolism predates language, as claimed by Langer, then symbolic intent is more concrete than language. What is verbal language other than tonal symbols?

    IF you follow Chomsky’s a priori grammatical theories, then you cannot deny that a system of gestures would eventually become language. Or, if you follow Skinner’s echolalia and autoclitism, then a deaf child would learn how to communicate through operant conditioning.

    I’m not quite sure that you’ve made a strong enough case to claim that A human being who lacks language may not be capable of rational thought, because language is absolutely necessary in order to represent experience .

    What is rational thought to you?

  4. You have no conclusive evidence regarding whether or not a deaf person in ancient greece had language.

    This is an argumentum ad ignorantiam, and best ignored. As for these other potential accounts for language, excepting Chomsky’s, I can’t say I am familiar with them, but i suspect they do not pass the Wittgensteinian test of meaning of words is use. All words are socially constructed – therefore, nobody can invent language by their lonesome.

    What is rational thought to you?

    Rational thought consists of generalizations, or technically, abstract representations – concepts – which are derivative of intuitive representations because they are representations reflected, or “representations of representations”. Concepts are neither perceptive nor individual elements in space and time, but since they emerge from reflection they are necessarily repetitions of the original world of perception and invented by reason as a convenience. A concept is essentially related to another representation, which serves as its ground of knowledge and this series of relations ends with a concept that has its ground in the knowledge of perception. Therefore, all abstract knowledge depends on the world of perception as its ground of knowledge. Those concepts that are related to other concepts are abstracta, while concepts that are directly related to knowledge of perception are concreta. “Relation,” “virtue,” “beginning” are some examples of abstracta; and examples like “man,” “stone,” or “horse” are examples of concreta. These abstractions are provisional short cuts that allow human beings to reason and use language. It is with abstraction that people are capable of perceiving the future and the past, and consequently, being self-conscious of the decisions to be made and being deliberate in actions.

    Since concepts are essentially distinct from intuitive representations, I do not think we can ever perceive or truly know anything evident of the essence of concepts. They remain at the discursive level, or at abstraction. Then, the acquirement of language grants the ability to conceive thoughts through abstractions. Rational thought is possible only with the existence of a language that can represent one’s experience in concepts.

  5. This is an argumentum ad ignorantiam, and best ignored.

    That the supposition cannot be proven renders it moot. You can neither claim nor deny that a deaf person in greece had language. Therefore it is best to indicate that it is likely that a deaf person in ancient greece did not have complete language.

    But that is besides the point.

    but i suspect they do not pass the Wittgensteinian test of meaning of words is use.

    Wittgenstein’s theories on semantics do not quite apply to a discussion on whether syntactical development is a priori or a posteriori. If syntax is a priori, in accordance to Chomsky’s theories, then gesture, which likely predates verbal language, has grammatical context. A deaf child in ancient greece would eventually develop a system of gestures which has a grammatic structure. It may be a constructed language, but it is a language nevertheless. The question remains whether this child possesses rational thought.

    If we turn to your beautiful summary of Kantian thought (Which would fall apart in empirical psychological studies of knowledge, but that is besides the point as well), then the child would not have rational thought because it could not apply language to represent its experience conceptually. But, if language acquisition is apriori and the child develops enough constructed language to represent its experience conceptually, then does it possess rational thinking, even if the rational thinking is a sort that is not accessible to others? Again, we are working with constructed language and our deaf grecian is not locked in a sensory-deprivation box.

    If language is a posteriori, then language acquired through operant conditioning does pass Wittgenstein’s social discourse theories because an operant-response relationship, especially with language development, requires a model for echolalia.

    It’s good that you’re studying philosophy, but philosophy is not an absolute. Wittgenstein’s theories of semantic acquisition are not absolute.

    But that goes without saying.

  6. Thank you for your comments. Apologies for being late, but life has other plans. I will continue to reflect on them, and the following comments are where we differ:

    Wittgenstein’s theories on semantics do not quite apply to a discussion on whether syntactical development is a priori or a posteriori.

    That is a trivial point because my point is the intelligibility of the language. A deaf person, with rough gestures, which others could understand as meaning practical things (buying or selling, eating) during Hellenistic Greece, probably could get by. But that would require us to loosen up the definition of language to include a rough sense of communication and i don’t know if i’m gonna go that far.

    If syntax is a priori, in accordance to Chomsky’s theories, then gesture, which likely predates verbal language, has grammatical context. A deaf child in ancient greece would eventually develop a system of gestures which has a grammatic structure. It may be a constructed language, but it is a language nevertheless.

    I am in agreement with Chomsky, largely because of his devastating critiques of the traditional view of how people acquire language. His positive account hasn’t survived, but this doesn’t mean we should ignore him at all.

    The question remains whether this child possesses rational thought.

    Perhaps this disagreement also stems from the word “rational.” First of all, rational language is overrated. Second of all, being intuitive does not require language at all.

    To be rational is to be capable of comparing and contrasting abstract concepts in reflection. These abstractions are concepts that have been constituted by (acquiring language) the ability to formulate a generalization of many particular instances, or philosophically speaking, the mental activity of abstracting concepts from the representations of perception. These concepts are objects of reason, conceived and articulated via language. I.e., a car is a general representation devised to stand for many individual objects of perception, say, a Dodge Durango, but the concept of car always leave out many detailed elements of what is perceived or experienced in each particular case.

    I contrast the rational with the intuitive, and the brain function of intuition is the understanding. This understanding deals with representations of perception, the objects of perception that contains as well as presuppose causality because they are mediated through the sense organs and the brain. All representations in perception are conditioned by the formal and categorial framework of the mind. The perceived object conforms to and are conditioned by the human senses and conceptual apparatus. Thus, all representations imply an object and subject, for they are always “object for a subject.”

    The faculty of reason employs the intelligible perception in its application, but it can only abstracts concepts from representations and organize them. Reason cannot truly create anything out of nothing, because it is a passive faculty. Reason in its abstracting activity is limited to re-arranging the generalization of perception, representations, because in order to know anything, it must be known by the understanding, be intuitively apprehended before it can be abstracted by the faculty of reason as a concept. Thus, physical activity in every form is more original than the representations that are intelligible. On the one hand, we are capable of grasping experience, life, with a more direct way of awareness, but on the other hand it is unlikely we can think without representations or particularly, think without language at all.

    Let’s look at animals – they are typically deficient in conceptual representations and do not form judgments, but they make up that with their superior brain function of the understanding, because they can cognize causality that is required for the cognitive ability of perception. Animals routinely demonstrate amazing ability of coping with the environment (elephants refusing to cross a bridge, despite crossing many others before, because it already knows the bridge won’t support its weight, etc). This behavior of animals indicate the ability to survive and thrive without the aid of reason – the ability to abstract concepts.

    For people who are intuitive, they can manipulate certain things skillfully, such as driving a car. By driving the intuitive person develops an immediate and perceptive knowledge. An experienced driver, say a NASCAR driver, possess brilliant intuitive knowledge of the laws of gravity, of inertia, all coded within the understanding for his immediate perception. The driver is the epitome of a pragmatist who employs his intuitive knowledge through perception by adjusting to the immediate factors in a race and winning them. Many inventors of exotic machines or talented craftsmen work easily without the aid of scientific knowledge whatsoever.

    Thus, reason only replaces the intuitions and perception with abstract concepts. This very act of abstraction loses the particular differences and instances of the perception and leaves behind a skeletal concept that does not accurately represent experience and never come anywhere close to exhaust it.

    If you’re clever, you’ll ask whether a person can be gifted at both aspects of reason and the understanding: Indeed, there are certain individuals who encompass both brilliantly: they employ an exceedingly original means of intuition in their grasp of the understanding in their insightful discoveries (hooke’s discovery of law of gravity, Lavoisier’s chemistry, Einstein’s relativity, etc). Basically, the great discoveries of knowledge do not consist long chains of abstractions but rather the presentation of the immediate knowledge for the faculty of reason in a way that never happened before. The genius marries his intuitive understanding with the proper concepts of reason for others. The ideal type is not an over-intellectual scholar, nor an inarticulate but experienced loner, but a person who recognizes the limits and the profits of both the understanding and reason and maximizes them in his or her self-odyssey.

    If we turn to your beautiful summary of Kantian thought (Which would fall apart in empirical psychological studies of knowledge, but that is besides the point as well), then the child would not have rational thought because it could not apply language to represent its experience conceptually.

    Good catch, but it’s not purely Kantian because I disagree on several fundamental levels.

    But, if language acquisition is apriori and the child develops enough constructed language to represent its experience conceptually, then does it possess rational thinking, even if the rational thinking is a sort that is not accessible to others? Again, we are working with constructed language and our deaf grecian is not locked in a sensory-deprivation box.

    Supposing syntax is a priori, if there are no external qualifiers to the words or gestures (reinforced by other people who share the same language), then it cannot be consistent at all.

    If language is a posteriori, then language acquired through operant conditioning does pass Wittgenstein’s social discourse theories because an operant-response relationship, especially with language development, requires a model for echolalia.

    Don’t be coy, tell me what you think. Smile.

    It’s good that you’re studying philosophy, but philosophy is not an absolute. Wittgenstein’s theories of semantic acquisition are not absolute.

    Perhaps not, but theory goes all the way down the rabbit hole and if you’re gonna pull short and look back fearfully like Orpheus, you will lose your Eurydice.

Comments are closed.