{"id":584,"date":"2011-09-17T16:17:39","date_gmt":"2011-09-17T22:17:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/?p=584"},"modified":"2011-09-17T18:47:56","modified_gmt":"2011-09-18T00:47:56","slug":"being-and-time-part-1-division-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/?p=584","title":{"rendered":"Being and Time: Part 1, Division 2"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Apologies on the late addition. Hopefully it&#8217;s not too garbled, and please feel free to discuss anything that strikes your fancy!<\/p>\n<p>\u00a712<br \/>\n<strong><em>Dasein<\/em> &amp; Authenticity<\/strong><br \/>\nAt first Heidegger says\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0exists. Sure, sounds great. But that&#8217;s just the tip of the iceberg.\u00a0Heidegger claims that there&#8217;s a basic difference between being and existing.\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0doesn&#8217;t JUST exist. It&#8217;s that ONLY <em>Dasein<\/em> exists. Other things, objects like furniture, cars, books, etc.,\u00a0<em>are<\/em>, but they do not exist in the strict sense of the word. Existence only comes into play with the realization of being. When a being becomes conscious of its own being, it begins to exist.\u00a0<!--more--><\/p>\n<p><em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is such a being. It is the only being that can do this, cuz by definition\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is that which can question its own being.<\/p>\n<p>In addition,\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is whatever I happen to be.\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is always me, but it means we can only ever talk about\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0in the first person. This does seems to associate\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0with the &#8220;subject&#8221; and its disreputable connotations, but Heidegger is too careful to get stuck with standard philosophical terminology. Thus\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0cannot be another &#8220;subject,&#8221; and end up as another artifact of traditional philosophy.<\/p>\n<p><em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0always exists in either of the following modes:\u00a0<strong>authenticity<\/strong>\u00a0or\u00a0<strong>non-authenticity<\/strong>, or is indifferent to them. What are these modes?\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is its possibilities, because the existence of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0becomes determined through its possibilities. These possibilities allow it to choose; thus, it can either choose itself or not.\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0can also lose itself or never reach itself to begin with, or appear to reach itself but fall short. More interestingly, it is not the case that when\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0reaches itself, it becomes &#8220;authentic.&#8221; Rather, the possibility of losing oneself or not becoming\/reaching oneself is based on authenticity as well.<\/p>\n<p>It is important to understand that Heidegger explicitly says that non-authenticity is not somehow &#8220;lesser&#8221; being than authenticity. There are\u00a0<em>no<\/em>\u00a0deficiencies. Being authentic is as important as being non-authentic. Then we should try to find out the authentic being of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>An authentic piece of art is the actual piece, the original statue, and not the cheap copy in the museum store.<\/p>\n<p>Does that mean\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is authentic if it really is\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>? What makes\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0<strong><em>Dasein<\/em><\/strong>? Best we can tell,\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0asks about its own being. Does that mean once\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is faced with the question of its being, only then is\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0proper, i.e., authentic? Otherwise, when\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0isn&#8217;t properly demonstrating this mode, is it non-authentic?<\/p>\n<p>It seems to me that\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is capable of other things than just asking question about its own being, but what makes it\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0and separate from other beings, is that precise ability.<\/p>\n<p><strong>In-der-Welt-Sein vs In-Sein<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Heidegger throws us off the deep end of Heideggerese with &#8220;Being-in-The-World&#8221; and &#8220;Being-In.&#8221; The former is the mode of being of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>, i.e.,\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is in the world. More specifically, in order to understand\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>, we must understand this being-in-the-world, and Heidegger lists three constituents:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>&#8220;In-the-world&#8221;<\/strong>\u00a0This forces us to inquire about the ontological structure of the world, and the concept of worldhood (<em>Weltlichkeit<\/em>). In order to understand the idea of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0that is always is in the world, the concept &amp; nature of world must be understood. If we don&#8217;t understand the world that\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0inhabits, we cannot understand\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>. Heidegger exhumes the ghost of Kant when he slips and says that being-in-the-world is an a priori form of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>. A sort of category for\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>.\u00a0<img decoding=\"async\" src=\"http:\/\/www.galilean-library.org\/site\/public\/style_emoticons\/default\/shakehead.gif\" alt=\":shakehead:\" \/><\/li>\n<li>The\u00a0<strong>being<\/strong>\u00a0that&#8217;s always the way of being-in-the-world. This is the solution to the problem of &#8220;who?&#8221; Since\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is always &amp; only a first person agent then it makes sense to ask who it is rather then what, given that &#8220;what&#8221; refers to beings that are not\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>. Just things present-to-hand. Our language demonstrates this distinction by clearly distinguishing between s\/he &amp; it.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Being-in<\/strong>\u00a0as such. Not much is said, other than the ontological constitution remains hidden.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Tho being-in-the-world can be analyzed, the entire &#8220;phenomenon&#8221; is always important, for it must be understood as a whole. Basically, constituents themselves are less important than how they relate to one another.<\/p>\n<p>In analyzing the idea of being-in, Heidegger notes that when we talk about present-to-hand beings, that is, ordinary things in the world, their being-in is to be understood as being-in &#8220;the world.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Seems like linguistic sleigh of hand, but these ordinary things are in the world like things are normally within something: a DVD disc in the computer, or my friend at the cigar lounge. Basically this is about the spatial relations of two things, where one thing is spatially related to another. This being is dubbed categorical, for it only fits ordinary objects or\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0as an ordinary object (such as my cigar smoking buddy when I consider him a &#8220;thing&#8221; in the lounge rather than a subject).<\/p>\n<p>Being-in proper is something that fits\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>: it is how\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is in the world, and therefore it is existential. This is not to be thought spatially. Heidegger means when\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0is, it is always a thing that is capable of questioning its own being, and therefore it has a relation to its own being unlike cigars and DVD discs. Since\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0has this unique relation to its own being, it also has a unique relation to where it is.<\/p>\n<p>When we think of our friends in places, we think of them in a different sense than ordinary things. We recognize that we&#8217;re in a particular place, and we can reflect on our being there.<\/p>\n<p>This kind of being that reflects cannot be accounted for by mere spatial determinations. My being in California is not just a matter of location or spatiality, although that is included, but some intersubjective and cultural thing like California that&#8217;s based on complex relations between people.<\/p>\n<p>I have a different relationship to being in California than being in a cigar lounge, for example, since I may also think that I am a Californian. Thinking on this further, we will notice ideas such as that I can &#8220;be&#8221; in California without actually being in California: my heart or my thoughts may be in California. At any rate, the basic notion is that our relation to the place we are in cannot be essentially spatial.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, being-in is also being in something familiar. In other words, we have a different relation to the things we are in than in the case of computers. This relation is familiar in the sense we have a relation to it.<\/p>\n<p>Heidegger shows how being-in is an existential of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>. This being-in is a mode of being for <em>Dasein<\/em> &amp; it is existential being instead of just mere categorical being, then this existential is related with a category.<\/p>\n<p>Aristotle, for instance claims that categories are the ways in which things are, and Kant says categories are ways in which objects are thought. Then existentials must be the Heideggerian counterparts of categories that are only for present-to-hand-things. Categories, for Heidegger, aren&#8217;t sufficient to exhaust the ways <em>Dasein<\/em> can be or thought.<\/p>\n<p>Here, it gets interesting: Heidegger claims that two things cannot truly touch each other unless they are <em>Dasein<\/em>. Hmm. The DVD disc cannot truly touch the tray of the DVD drive. According to Heidegger, because the DVD would have to be something to the tray that the tray would face or meet. This seems to be that since they do not have any relation to one another in the same sense we do to things, they cannot meet and thus they cannot touch as well. They may be spatially next to one another, but touching belongs to the relationship in the sense we human beings have relationships with each other.<\/p>\n<p>Heidegger moves quickly from this interesting point to the claim that\u00a0<em>Dasein&#8217;s<\/em>\u00a0being in a world is a fact. No biggie. But Heidegger is never mundane. He&#8217;s Heidegger! He obviously means the facticity of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>. This is a problem of the translation. Heidegger distinguishes two German words that are both translated as fact:\u00a0<em><strong>Tatasche<\/strong><\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<strong><em>Factum<\/em><\/strong>.\u00a0<em>Tatasche<\/em>applies to present-to-hand-beings and\u00a0<em>Factum<\/em>\u00a0applies to <em>Dasein<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Thus the difference between a DVD&#8217;s existence being a fact and a\u00a0<em>Dasein&#8217;s<\/em>\u00a0existence being a fact. Moreover, the fact of\u00a0<em>Dasein&#8217;s<\/em>\u00a0existence includes the idea of\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0being conscious of its existence. Basically,\u00a0<em>Dasein<\/em>\u00a0has a relationship to its own being, as well as a relationship to the world it lives in and this relationship is rather important for Heidegger introduces a new term:\u00a0<em>Besorgen<\/em>, or taking care.<\/p>\n<p><em>Dasein&#8217;s<\/em>\u00a0being in the world is always laden with this &#8220;taking care.&#8221; Due to\u00a0<em>Dasein&#8217;s<\/em>\u00a0relation to its surrounding, it takes care of it: it deals with another person, produces a thing, cherishes, uses, examines, acts, and so forth. All those actions are taking care, as well as their negations: neglecting or letting go, or abandoning. Taking care is a very inclusive concept.<\/p>\n<p>In \u00a713 we will go in depth on the Exemplification of Being-In, and in \u00a714, the ideas of Worldliness\u00a0next!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Apologies on the late addition. Hopefully it&#8217;s not too garbled, and please feel free to discuss anything that strikes your fancy! \u00a712 Dasein &amp; Authenticity At first Heidegger says\u00a0Dasein\u00a0exists. Sure, sounds great. But that&#8217;s just the tip of the iceberg.\u00a0Heidegger claims that there&#8217;s a basic difference between being and existing.\u00a0Dasein\u00a0doesn&#8217;t JUST exist. It&#8217;s that ONLY &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/?p=584\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Being and Time: Part 1, Division 2<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_is_tweetstorm":false,"jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_options":[]},"categories":[9,2],"tags":[77,235,338,55],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p1Af2X-9q","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/584"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=584"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/584\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":590,"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/584\/revisions\/590"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=584"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=584"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.hyperboreans.com\/heterodoxia\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=584"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}