The title of this blog is but a poor attempt to capture Nietzsche’s contemptuous summation from his attempt at self-critique of Birth of Tragedy: a mere fabrication for purposes of gulling: at best, an artistic fiction; at worst, an outrageous imposture.
The Problem of Evil (PoE), as formulated within the philosophical & theological tradition, presupposes that one acknowledges a magisterial god who is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good. If such a being exists, then the existence of evil becomes a moral mystery. On the face of things, an all good God would eliminate evil; an all-knowing God would know how to eliminate evil, an all-powerful God would be able to eliminate evil, an all-good God would desire to eliminate evil. Evil shouldn’t exist, if God exists, because everything should already be perfect, precisely because the world is the creation of a perfect creator. Continue reading Kant, Schopenhauer, and the Problem of Evil
Typically, the literature indicates three types of love, such as Eros (erotic, sexual, since Romantic age, “romantic”) Philia (Friendship and family relations) and Agape (Caritas, asexual, unselfish and altruistic), but the most exciting type is Eros. It has been hypercognized, meaning it has been excessively talked about, whether one is in love, looking for love, hurt in love, lost love, or just gossiping about scandals. Oddly, love isn’t a popular topic in the philosophy corpus, after Plato, notwithstanding some half-hearted attempts and concessions. Continue reading Erotic Love
I agree that devil’s advocacy in no way indicates the position they hold, but this misunderstands the philosophy as autobiography maxim. That one may take positions one doesn’t actually hold does not militate against the confession thesis, for the reasons of their advocacy remains the same as if they were advocating their own beliefs. If one were to be an incorrigible devil’s advocate, he would be an anarchic epistemologist who thinks all positions deserve advocacy, and that would be a position of its own open to the confession charge about his own beliefs regarding positions and ideas. Continue reading Reading philosophy as confession
There is no doctrine to be found anywhere in the Dialogues. This means the Republic is little more than a commercial for philosophy.
The arguments are intended to be fallacious in the Republic, because this Dialogue was written in order to demonstrate the problems of a fanatical pursuit of justice. It admits philosophical Eros is unattainable, given the dilemma of the philosopher who is torn between the desire to rule and the declination to rule. Continue reading Interpreting Plato
Due to the recent trends in modern thought, (given the various forms of modernity as avant-garde, decadence, kitsch, and postmodernism) the Great Tradition of Philosophy has died, and more interestingly, this has happened very quietly. Continue reading Golgotha of Philosophy
In my readings I came across a fascinating theory by Stephen Toulmin that concerned the relationship between modern philosophy and literature. Philosophy underwent a paradigm shift in the 17th century, a time that was torn by religious wars (only 30 years of European peace between 1560 and 1715). Thinkers who grew tired of the pettiness of their time urged for a theoretical approach that was atemporal, all-inclusive, and independent of context. They were convinced that a pure theory, a formal logic that was free of the taint of history or culture could issue forth truths that avoided the vicious reality of violence (war, punishment, etc.) and the practical wisdom of rhetoric. Continue reading Modern Philosophy’s loss is Literature’s gain
Deleuze teaches us that the question “what is the use of philosophy” is an attempt at irony and sarcasm, and deserves an aggressive answer. Philosophy has no concerns. It does not obey the State or the Church or any other established power. Continue reading The use of philosophy
Typically, a person does not believe that her belief is a belief. If she does come to believe that a belief is a belief, she will recognize it for what it is, a mere belief, and no longer wholeheartedly believe in it. “To believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer to believe… every belief is a belief that falls short, one never wholly believes what one believes.” (Being and Nothingness, p. 69) A person is able to suspend disbelief in a belief because she fails to spell out to herself the fact that a belief is merely a belief. Spelling out the policy of not spelling out undermines the policy. Coming to believe that a belief is merely a belief undermines the belief. If a person comes to believe that a belief is a belief, then she ceases to be convinced by it and loses faith in it, because by its very nature, belief implies doubt. Continue reading Belief
Traditionally, the two types of explanation are synthesis and analysis. Leibniz defined synthesis as “the process in which we begin from principles and …[proceed to]…build up theorems and problems,” and analysis as “the process in which we begin with a given conclusion or proposed problem and seek the principles by which we may demonstrate the conclusion or solve the problem.” (Philosophical Papers and Letters, p 286) It seems trivial to suppose that a complete explanation would of course include both types. However, if we do attempt a complete explanation, we will end with paradoxes. Continue reading Limits of explanation
